Credit constraints are considered to be an important driver of low adoption of preventive health investments among low-income households in developing countries. However, it is not obvious whether, and the extent to which, the provision of labelled loans -credit associated with a specific investment by name only -will boost lumpy human capital investments. We investigate this theoretically and empirically in the context of a sanitation loan program in rural India. Theoretically, we establish that when the loan label matters, households may be credit constrained for that investment even if they have access to credit. Drawing on a cluster randomized controlled trial, and rich household and administrative data, we show that targeted households demand the sanitation loans, and toilet uptake increases by 9 percentage points. Overall household borrowing is however not affected by the introduction of the new, cheaper, loan product. An exploration of channels indicates that both the loan label and lower interest rate matter in explaining the findings. Credit based interventions are thus a viable strategy to improve uptake of lumpy preventive health investments, though there is significant room for improvement in the design of such interventions.
Introduction
Credit constraints have been shown to be an important driver of low adoption of preventive health investments among low-income households in developing countries. Studies over the past decade have shown that relaxing credit constraints through the provision of cash, with and without conditions, (e.g. Benhassine et al., 2015) or credit, particularly microfinance loans bundled with the investment (Yishay et al., 2017 , Tarozzi et al., 2014 , Devoto et al., 2012 , can boost health investments. However, when the desired preventive health investment is not bundled with the loan, take-up may not increase, especially since poor households face numerous demands on household budgets and when such loans have other attractive attributes (e.g. price). Though widely available, the effectiveness of labelled loans -loans associated with the investment by name only -in boosting preventive health investments is not well known. On the one hand, the label in itself could increase the desired investment either because households believe that the lender will monitor and reward loan use, or because they are mental accounters. On the other hand, , other (attractive) attributes of such loans might divert funds to other investments.
In this paper, we draw on a cluster randomized controlled trial of a sanitation loan program to study whether labelled loans can boost the adoption of household toilets in rural India. The trial, conducted among clients of a leading microfinance institution, made available micro-loans for sanitation in randomly selected communities in rural Maharashtra. The loans, offered at a lower interest rate relative to other loans, were to be used for the construction of a new toilet; or the repair or upgrade of an existing toilet. However, the loans were not bundled with a specific toilet or materials, and households were left to their own devices to source materials and arrange construction. Moreover, the implementing microfinance institution did not closely monitor loan use, nor did it incentivize or enforce use of this loan product for sanitation investment. We argue that these features make this a labelled loan.
Rural India is a particularly apt context in which to study the adoption of household toilets. According to the WHO-UNICEF Joint Monitoring Program, around 57 percent of households in rural India practiced open defecation. 1 High rates of open defecation have been linked to poor health and higher morbidity (Augsburg and Rodriguez-Lesmes, 2018; Spears, 2012; Kumar and Vollmer, 2013; Pickering et al., 2015 and Dickinson et al., 2015) , worse human capital outcomes (Spears and Lamba, 2015) ; and also constrain economic growth (WHO/UNICEF, 2014). Lack of access to safe sanitation is even more pronounced in our study context -Latur and Nanded districts in Maharashtra. Only around 27 precent of households in study villages had a private household toilet before the roll-out of the sanitation loan program. 2 Interestingly, households in this context typically identify the financial cost and affordability as the key reason for not having a toilet: 83 percent of households that do no own a toilet report that they are not able to afford one ; making the sanitation loan program particularly policy relevant.
To guide the interpretation of the empirical findings, we specify a simple theoretical framework to assess how labelled loans and other loan attributes, affect households' borrowing and investment choices. In a simple, two-period model, we show that when the label attached to a loan matters, a household's borrowing and investment decisions are distorted toward the investment associated with the loan label. Money will no longer be fungible. As a consequence, in the absence of a loan specifically labelled as a sanitation loan, a household might not be able to borrow for sanitation, even though it has access to credit. The household is thus sanitation credit constrained. Introducing a sanitation loan will relax this constraint and motivate sanitation take-up.
The uptake of sanitation loans is however not sufficient to determine whether the labelled loan program we study would be effective in increasing toilet uptake. Households might take up the sanitation loan product (also) for other reasons, including the lower interest rate. Especially when the uptake is associated with substitution away from more expensive loan sources, without a change in investment decisions, sanitation loan uptake will not be accompanied by increased sanitation investment. However, the lower interest rate may yet make sanitation investments more affordable (though not relatively), motivating sanitation investments. Thus, the overall impact of a lower interest rate loan on sanitation investment is ambiguous.
Next, we empirically study the impacts of the loan program. We show that, in the context we study, households demand the newly available loan product, with 18 percent of eligible households taking a sanitation loan. Given the lower interest rate, smaller installments and longer maturity than those of most other available loan products, the loan uptake in itself is insufficient evidence to establish the existence of credit constraints for sanitation. Households might for example simply shift away from other -less favorable -credit sources. And indeed, we do not find evidence that the sanitation loan uptake is accompanied by an increase in total household borrowing.
We then study the impacts of the program on sanitation investments. We find that the program increases the uptake of new toilets by 9 percentage points. As we show, this increase is over and above a large increase in toilet uptake in the control areas, probably as a consequence of the Government of India's Swacch Bharat Mission (SBM) policy. There is little evidence that the loans were used to upgrade or repair existing toilets. Importantly for policy, the vast majority of constructed toilets are safe, high-quality toilets.
The theoretical model proposes two possible channels for the increased sanitation loan uptake and investment: (i) The label associated with the loan allowed households that were previously credit constrained for sanitation to now invest in a toilet, or (ii) the more favorable interest rate could have made it easier to borrow more, and thereby increase sanitation investments. The former would imply that the label mattered both before and after the sanitation loan was introduced: on the one hand ensuring that previously offered products, which are also labelled, are not used for sanitation investments and on the other hand ensuring that the new loan product is invested into sanitation and hence expanding the investment choices of households.
We then study descriptively which of these two channels can explain our findings, and find evidence that both are at play. In line with the idea that the loan label matters, we find that 62 percent of clients who were eligible for a sanitation loan took a (more expensive) business loan instead.
We also find no evidence that clients take more expensive business loans only after exhausting the cheaper sanitation loan: 31 percent of clients, who could have taken this combination of loans thereby reducing overall borrowing costs, choose to take a more expensive business loan only.
However, our evidence also suggests that the interest rate matters. In line with this, we find that not all sanitation loans are used for sanitation investment. We estimate that only around half of the sanitation loans resulted in a new toilet, with repairs and upgrades to existing toilets would account for a very small proportion of the remainder. Indeed, one third of clients report using the sanitation loan for a non-sanitation purpose. The fact that the intended loan use is objectively verifiable in our context allows us to make an important contribution to the literature. Very few studies have attempted to measure compliance with expected use of microfinance loans, particularly those that are not bundled with a specific product -as was the case here. Though part of the lower loanto-toilet conversion rate could be explained by other constraints (e.g. absence of complementary investments or additional funds), this evidence also suggests that the loan effect might not have been sufficiently strong for at least a sub-set of households to induce use of the sanitation loan for sanitation investment purposes. In line with this, we note that 28 percent of clients that took a sanitation loan already had a toilet at baseline, and 9 percent of clients who took a sanitation loan and reported using it for sanitation did not have a toilet at the time of our endline survey. Thus, this evidence suggests that the label effect is likely to be heterogenous across households. With this evidence, we are unfortunately unable to disentangle the relative importance of the interest rate and the loan label in explaining our findings on loan uptake and toilet uptake.
Our study contributes to a number of literatures. First, it relates to the literature on credit constraints and human capital investments. A wide range of methodologies have been used to assess the importance of credit constraints in explaining education outcomes in developed and developing countries (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo, 2012; Solis, 2017 among others) ; and health investments (Dupas and Robinson, 2013; Guiteras et al., 2016) . Within this, a small, but growing, literature uses randomized experiments to assess the scope for microcredit loans to boost investments in preventive health products such as water connections (Devoto et al., 2012) , bednets (Tarozzi et al., 2014) , water filters (Guiteras et al., 2016) and sanitation construction materials (Yishay et al., 2017) . In all of these cases, the loans are provided in conjunction with a specific product, which contrasts with our study of an unbundled, but labelled, loan. Moreover, in contrast to many of these studies, we analyze a particularly lumpy investment that constitutes a much larger share of households' wealth than in most other studies.
It also contributes to a growing literature studying the role of labelling, and of the fungibility of money. Numerous studies show that individuals do not adjust other spending in response to the provision of vouchers earmarked for specific spending items (Abeler and Marklein, 2017; Hastings and Shapiro, forthcoming) ; while other contributions show that labelled cash transfers and benefits are disproportionately spent on the named expenditure category (Beatty et al., 2014; Benhassine et al., 2015) . We contribute to this literature by studying labelled loans, and showing theoretically that loan labels can matter for credit constraints.
Finally, our study links to a growing literature studying the adoption of safe sanitation in developing countries. Rigorous evidence is now available on the effectiveness of a number of sanitation interventions in different contexts, many of which entail (contrary to the setting in this study) an informational component, most often in the form of the widely adopted community led total sanitation approach, which seeks to motivate communities to come together to improve their sanitation situation following a 'triggering' session that relies on shame and disgust. Many of these find larger effects than we do, but they only do so when the intervention is very intense and/or combined with relaxing other, often financial constraints. Pickering et al. [2015] for example found that 18 months after a CLTS campaign with intense follow-ups in Mali, toilet ownership increased by 30pp. Clasen et al. [2014] find an increase of 28 percentage points (pp) in ownership of functioning toilets, up to two years after the implementation of CLTS-like promotion activities combined with the delivery of toilet construction subsidies in rural India. An evaluation of the same program but in rural Madhya Pradesh, rather than Odisha, estimated that 21 months after the intervention was delivered, toilet ownership increased by 19pp (Patil et al., 2014) . On the other hand, evidence from a CLTS-inspired intervention conducted in Bangladesh found no significant impacts on toilet ownership one and a half years after the intervention, unless it was paired with subsidy provision (Guiteras et al., 2015) in which case the uptake was 7 percentage points. Similarly, an evaluation of CLTS implemented at a large-scale in East Java, Indonesia, found an increases in toilet ownership of only 3 percentage points 24 months after the intervention (Cameron et al., 2013) . This impact is in line with the impacts found in a pure CLTS implementation in Nigeria (Abramovsky et al., 2018) .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the context of the study and the sanitation loan product, providing evidence to support our argument that this is a labelled loan. Section3 discusses the experiment, followed by the exposition of a simple theoretical model in Section 4. Section 5 describes the empirical methodology. Results are presented in Section 6 and we conclude the paper in Section 7.
Context and intervention

Context
Our study concentrates on 5 blocks of 2 districts, Latur and Nanded, in the South-Eastern area of the Maharashtra, India (see Figure 1 ). Maharashtra, with its capital Mumbai, is one of the largest Indian states, counting approximately 100 million people living in almost 44,000 villages (GoI, 2011) . While this is the second richest state in the country in terms of per capita income, incidence of poverty remains close to the national average, implying severe inequalities within the state (GoM, 2012) . Latur and Nanded are among the most deprived parts of Maharashtra, with average poverty incidence of 35 percent. 40 (77) percent of (female) household heads have not attended school, and only 13 percent of villages had a primary health centre in their village, indicating poor infrastructure overall (IIPS, 2014) . The main economic activity is agriculture, with roughly 54 percent of households reliant on it for their main source of income, followed by 26 percent of households depending mainly on wage employment. Access to sanitation facilities is very poor in the study area: prior to the start of the intervention we study (in February 2015) , only 26 percent of households had access to a toilet. Most of these were private household toilets. Financing was reported as the major constraint for not having a toilet: 83 percent of households in our study reported affordability or price as the key reason for not having a toilet. This is unsurprising since a toilet comprises of a significant outlay for households.
The typical cost of a toilet recommended by the Government of India's Swachh Bharat Mission -Gramin 3 is 20 percent of annual income of the average household in our sample. Setting aside such a significant sum would be challenging for poor rural households, particularly given other more pressing demands on household budgets. Formal financial services are generally available in the study areas, with a number of microfinance institutions providing credit to poor households.
However, few institutions provided credit specifically for non-income generating purposes including human capital investments; and none provided credit for sanitation when the experiment took place.
Government efforts to improve sanitation coverage in rural India comprise of two core approaches: encouraging household demand for toilets through a one-off behavioral change campaign, modeled roughly on the widely used Community Led Total Sanitation approach, and alleviation of financial constraints for specific targeted households through the provision of subsidies. The subsidy is worth about Rs 12,000 in the study area; an amount that is insufficient to cover the cost of toilets desired by households. Given concerns of leakage, under the Total Sanitation Campaign and Nirmal Bharat Abhiyan policies, subsidies were made available post-construction from local village authorities.
Under the SBM-G scheme, implemented around the same time as the intervention we study, part of the subsidy can be availed once construction preparation has started with the rest available post-construction. 4
Intervention
It is in this context that our implementing partner, a large microfinance institution (MFI, hereon) active in 5 states in India, introduced a sanitation loan product for their existing clients. The MFI provides financial (primarily microcredit and micro-insurance) and non-financial services to groups of women from low-income households in rural and semi-urban areas. 5 It offers a wide range of loans including income generating loans, emergency loans, festival loans, and education loans. It started providing microfinance loans for sanitation in 2009, introducing these in our study area from 2014 onwards. At the time of the intervention roll-out, the partner MFI was the only provider of sanitation loans in the study area.
The sanitation loan offered by the MFI covers a maximum amount of Rs 15,000, incurring 18-22 percent interest rate per annum at a declining balance over a 2-year repayment period. 6 The loan amount is sufficient to cover the costs of a low-cost safe toilet of the type recommended by the SBM Guidelines. However, Indian households have been documented to spend much more on toilet construction -for example, households in the control group report an average toilet construction cost of around Rs 25,000 -suggesting the need for supplementary funds to construct the types of toilets these households desire. In addition to the interest, loan costs include a processing fee of 1.1 percent of total amount and a Rs 306 life insurance premium. Clients repay the loans through 4 A companion paper, Augsburg, Caeyers and Malde (2018) , studies whether the micro-credit intervention studied in this paper complements the SBM scheme.
5 As of February 2017, the MFI reported a gross loan portfolio of Rs. 3,025.62 Crore. As of March 31, 2017, they had 1,450,298 total borrowers compared to 1,205,974 in the previous year.
6 At the onset of the experiment, the interest rate was set at 22 percent, but this was subsequently reduced to 20 and then 18 percent. This was a general policy change by the implementing MFI, reflecting an overall reduction in the cost of capital it faced. In our sample, 35 percent of loans taken were at a rate of 22 percent, 49 percent at a rate of 20 percent and 16 percent at a rate of 22 percent. regular weekly or bi-weekly payments. In practice, all clients chose to repay the loan on a weekly basis.
The loan amount is higher than that for other non-productive loans offered by the MFI, and carries a similar or lower interest rate and a longer repayment period. 7 The extended loan maturity implies that the weekly installment amount is lower than for other loans of comparable size; making it appealing to liquidity constrained borrowers, despite the overall cost of the loan being substantially higher. 8 Business loan products are of a similar or larger size, but have a higher interest rate. There is no collateral requirement but loans are provided through joint-liability lending groups of 5 -10 members. Only women that have been clients of the MFI for at least one year are eligible to take a sanitation loan. Each client can obtain only one sanitation loan. The MFI requires clients interested in applying for a sanitation loan to obtain agreement from their spouses before the application is processed. A credit bureau check is conducted for all loan applications, and applications are rejected if the client doesn't satisfy the criteria set out by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). 9 10 This sanitation loan, as with other loan products provided by the MFI, can be classified as a 'labelled' loan. The reason for this is threefold: First, while the MFI provides loans for many different purposes -income generation, education, festival, etc -none of the loans is bundled with a specific product related to the intended investment purpose and all funds are disbursed directly to the client. This is also the case for the sanitation loan: loans were not bundled with any specific 7 Information on main loan products offered by the MFI is provided in Appendix B (Table B .1) 8 The weekly installment amount of a sanitation loan is between Rs. 179 and 173 depending on the interest rate. The weekly instalment amount for a Rs. 10,000 education loan varies between Rs. 218 and 214 over the intervention period.
9 The Reserve Bank of India imposes the following requirements on microfinance customers from October 2015 (pre-October 2015): (1) Annual household income of at most Rs. 100,000 (Rs. 60,000) for rural customers; (2) Total indebtedness of at most Rs. 100,000 (Rs. 50,000) excluding education and medical expenses; (3) Overall loan amount should not exceed Rs. 60,000 (Rs. 35,000) in the first cycle and Rs. 100,000 (Rs. 50,000) in subsequent cycles; (4) Tenure of loan should not be less than 24 months for any loan amount in excess of Rs. 30,000 (Rs. 15,000). In addition, at least 50 percent (75 percent) of the MFI's portfolio should be comprised of loans provided for income generation.
10 Other sources of sanitation and home improvement loans were available in our study area. From credit bureau records we know that clients in our sample have taken loans from 27 microfinance providers before and during the intervention. . toilet model or material for the construction, and the MFI did not provide any advice or guidance on the construction of a toilet, available masons, types of toilet, etc. Clients were free to install a toilet of their own choice. This is in contrast with other studies of microcredit loans for health investments, such as Yishay et al. [2017] who study the effects of microcredit on the willingness to pay for a low-cost toilet, where the toilet construction materials were delivered to the client's door-step; Tarozzi et al. [2014] who study the uptake of a specific type of mosquito bednets with and without microcredit loans, and Guiteras et al. [2016] who study the effects of microcredit and microsavings on the willingness to pay for a ceramic water filter product.
The second aspect that makes this loan a labelled loan, is that the actual use is not closely monitored by the MFI in that, when monitoring is conducted, most checks rely on the reporting of the client or group members. 15 percent of clients that took a sanitation loan report that no monitoring check whatsoever was done, either at application stage or after loan disbursement; 53 percent report that monitoring was done through asking herself or a group member; 30 percent of clients report that loan officers visited their home to check whether they owned a toilet when applying or to check its use.
We note that monitoring use is notoriously difficult [Karlan and Zinman, 2011] . While monitoring of sanitation investment, particularly the construction of a new toilet, is easier to observe than many other investments, problems remain: Clients can provide strategic answers, or lie, and even when monitoring is done in the most stringent way possible, i.e. by visiting the clients at their home, the fact that toilets are often constructed outside, as a separate construction to the dwelling, provides the opportunity to for example pass the neighbor's toilet as one's own. Moreover, loan officers' loan use checks are not monitored or incentivized by the MFI. They too may have an incentive to lie. To give some supportive statistics from our context: 26 percent of clients that took a sanitation loan reported using it for the construction of a new toilet; despite already owning a toilet (verified by survey interviewers) before the intervention began. . This links to the third aspect important for our classification of labelled loans, namely that the MFI does not enforce or incentivize loan use in any specific manner, such as through larger loan sizes or lower interest rates; or through incentives and sanctions for loan officers. As with many other MFIs, senior management's core focus is on minimizing default and late repayment. Conversations with the top management of the MF partner, and staff involved in loan approval -which occurs in the head office -indicated to us that past loan use is not taken into consideration when approving a loan application. By contrast, new loans are not approved if a client is late in repaying an existing loan/has a past loan that is in default. In line with this, we find that 34 percent of clients who took a sanitation loan and had neither a toilet at baseline or at endline took a subsequent loan in the period of our experiment. 11 11 More strikingly, 89 percent of clients who took a sanitation loan and had a toilet at baseline already took a subsequent loan from the same MFI. Here loans could have been used for repair or upgrade, but -as we show in Section 6.2 -this form of sanitation investment makes up only a small part of sanitation investments, Clients typically report to have used loans for the construction of new toilets.
The Experiment
Experimental Design
Our study covers 81 Gram Panchayats (GPs) within Latur and Nanded districts in rural Maharashtra, India. GPs are the smallest administrative unit in India, and are charged with the delivery of a number of programs, including the Government's flagship Swacch Bharat Mission (SBM) policy.
The study GPs were selected based on two criteria: (i) the MFI had existing operations and (ii) no sanitation activities had been undertaken by the MFI in the GP. 12 A total of 133 GPs satisfied this criterion. Of these, 120 were randomly selected to be part of the study. 39 of these GPs were randomly selected to receive another program, and are studied in a companion research paper.
Study GPs were randomized into the treatment and control groups through stratified randomization, with 40 selected to receive the sanitation credit program and 41 selected as controls. Stratified randomization was used in order to boost power. Strata were defined based on the Branch of the MFI and size of the village (specifically, a village was classified as 'small' if it had fewer than 480 households and large otherwise). Figure 1 shows the locations of each of the study GPs, with an indication of their 'treatment' status in the study.
All study GPs, including control GPs, continued to receive all other activities from the MFI. The intervention began in February 2015. Care was taken throughout the study period to ensure that the integrity of the research design was preserved. Authors conducted briefing sessions with the branch staff of the MFI before the start of the intervention, provided a pictorial reminder of the GPs where sanitation credit could not be offered, and monitored the disbursement of sanitation credit to control GPs using the MFI's administrative monitoring system. As a result, contamination of the control group was very limited: a small number of loans was given out in the control group a few months after intervention roll-out, but this was swiftly stopped once noticed by the research team.
Data
Our analysis draws on three sources of data. The first is an extensive household survey collected by the authors. This is linked with administrative loan data from the MFI partner. The final source of data is credit bureau reports, providing information on loans taken by sampled clients from all microfinance providers in the study areas.
Primary Survey Data
A survey on a sample of clients that had been active at the time of the roll-out in February 2015, and their households, was conducted in the period August to September 2017, about 2.5 years 12 Note also that the set of GPs in which the MFI is operational is a result of a careful selection exercise by MFI head quarters (e.g. to be selected a GP has to be politically stable, have a certain number of women, etc) and can therefore not be considered representative for the state of Maharashtra, nor for Nanded and Latur districts.
after sanitation loans were made available. 2,841 clients (on average 24 per GP) were interviewed by a survey company (with interviewers blind to the outcome of the randomization): 1,253 in the treatment and 1,588 in the control group. 13,14 Overall, we sampled around 75 percent of all clients active at the time of the intervention launch. Our sampling strategy focused on including clients from the same lending centre (kendra), in order to allow us to collect information on joint liability groups. Though it is not a random sample of clients, our high sampling rate ensures that the obtained sample is mostly representative of clients active in February 2015. 15 The household survey, asked of the household head, collected detailed information on household demographics, labour supply, and borrowing from formal and informal sources. In addition, a separate client survey elicited information on a number of different dimensions of her joint liability group, and interactions with the microfinance provider. Detailed information on sanitation investment was also collected, including that on type of toilet, construction date and costs, and toilet usage. The information on the construction date allows us to obtain a retrospective measure of toilet ownership before the start of the intervention, which we will refer to as baseline toilet ownership. 16 For households who reported having a toilet, survey enumerators verified it directly and made observations on its appearance, overground quality, and cleanliness.
Administrative Data
In addition to the primary endline survey of clients and their households, we rely on two sources of administrative data in our analysis. The first is detailed loan data from our lending partner on all clients residing in the study areas. In particular, we have available information on all loans taken from the partner MFI by any client residing in our study GPs during the study period, including amount borrowed, repayment amount, the date of disbursement, tenure, purpose of the loan and default. This provides us with reliable information on the disbursement of sanitation loans and other loans, and allows us to track trends for loan uptake over time.
The second source of administrative data is credit bureau data from a leading provider, used by the MFI partner when making decisions on loan applications. Following new regulations introduced by the Reserve Bank of India in 2011, all microfinance institutions are required to report on all loans outstanding for each client on a monthly basis. We obtained this information for around 88 percent of clients in our sample. 17 Reassuringly, the sample for whom we have credit bureau information is balanced on observable characteristics across treatment and control, as shown in Table B .3 in Appendix A. 18 As a result, this data allows us to construct a more accurate measure of household borrowing from microfinance institutions that is free from recall and measurement error. Table 2 presents summary statistics for the main characteristics of clients and their households.
Sample Descriptives and Sample Balance
These variables have been constructed from survey data collected at endline. We thus concentrate on variables that are unlikely to have been affected by the intervention itself. For each variable we present, in Column 1 of Table 2 , the mean for the control group when the experiment started.
The table also tests for systematic differences in these characteristics between the control and treatment groups, with the difference in means between the control and treatment group, and the p-value for a t-test of equality of these means presented in Columns 3 and 4 respectively. As the allocation of the sanitation loan program was random across GPs, we expect no systematic differences between the two groups at the time of the intervention roll-out. 19 The table indicates that the typical study household is Hindu (68 percent), has on average five household members, and is headed by a male household member (91 percent Using toilet construction date, we create an indicator of toilet ownership before the start of the intervention. 20 We observe that only 25 percent of control group households owned a toilet at baseline. Remarkably, this matches closely with the 2012 baseline survey conducted by the Indian Ministry of Drinking Water and Sanitation, which shows that on average 27.4 percent of households in the study GPs reported to have a toilet in 2012 (SBM and Sanitation, 2014). (2.97) Notes: SL refers to sanitation loan treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. HH stands for household. Column 2 reports mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) for each variable in the control group. Column 3 reports differences in means between SL and Control treatment arms. Toilet ownership at baseline is reconstructed from toilet construction dates reported at endline. If a toilet was in the dwelling when household moved in we consider number of years HH head lived in the household as a proxy of construction date.
Columns 3 and 4 indicates at most small, and statistically insignificant differences in the means of these variables across the treatment and control group. This confirms that the randomization was successful in creating observationally equivalent groups. Importantly, we find no significant difference in toilet ownership between the treatment and control groups prior to intervention rollout.
Conceptual Framework
We lay out a simple theoretical framework to obtain predictions on how a labelled loan will influence sanitation loan uptake, and toilet uptake decisions.
We consider a household that lives for two periods, t = 1, 2. In each period, the household earns labor income of y t units. In period 1, the household can consume non-durable goods, c 1 , or invest in a lumpy goods, E and D. The investment decisions for these goods are denoted as e 1 and d 1 respectively, and the cost of each good is p e and p d respectively. Good E is a productive investment (e.g. a business investment) that generates a non-stochastic pre-period return s < p e in each of the two periods. Good D is a toilet (i.e. a lumpy preventive health investment) that requires one period to build, so that it only yields benefits in the form of increased utility by m units one period after the investment is made. This utility gain captures both the monetary (e.g. reduced health expenditures) and non-monetary benefits (e.g. improved convenience, safety, etc) of having a toilet as compared to defecating in the open.
Prior to the intervention, the household only has access to a microfinance loan labelled as a business loan, b 1 , in period 1. The loan is provided collateral-free, at an interest rate of r 1 . The household can borrow at most b max
1
. It cannot save. We also assume that c d + c e > b max 1 , so that the maximum amount of this business loan b 1 is insufficient to cover both the business investment and the sanitation investment.
The fact that the loan is earmarked for business investment through its label as a 'business' loan could influence household choices for a number of reasons. First, households may believe (correctly or incorrectly) that the lender will monitor loan use, with penalties associated with loan misuse.
Second, households may (potentially incorrectly) believe that loan use also plays a role in building their reputation with the lender, along the same lines as timely repayment does. Offering gradually larger loans at lower interest rates has been an important driver of the high repayment rates of microfinance institutions (Morduch, 1999) . Households might therefore see proper loan use as a further means to signal to the lender that they are a good client, worthy of larger and cheaper loans in the future. Finally, labels attached to loans might matter if households are mental accounters, and assign sources of money to different expenditures and investments based on these labels. A loan labelled as a business loan would thus be associated with the associated business investment, and cannot be spent on other expenditures or investments.
We model the effect of the label in the form of a utility penalty that applies when the household does not use a labelled loan for its intended purpose. The utility loss is experienced in the same period when the loan is taken and used. This formulation is similar in spirit to Hastings and Shapiro [Forthcoming] . Specifically, a household that borrows b 1 and does not use it for business investment will experience a utility penalty of κ e b 1 , where κ e ≥ 0 is an exogenous parameter.
We assume that in the first period, the household gains utility from its non-durable consumption, net of any penalties from taking a business loan and using it for some other purpose. In the second period, it gains utility from its non-durable consumption and sanitation-related benefits, if a sanitation investment was made in the first period. Specifically, the household's first period utility is written as v(c n1 ) − κ e b 1 (1 − e 1 ), and the second-period utility is v(c n2 ) + md 1 ; where v(c) is a concave, twice differentiable function that is increasing in c. Notice that this formulation implicitly assumes that the productive investment, E, does not yield any non-monetary utility benefits to the household. The household's discount factor is β.
The household's inter-temporal optimization problem can be written as follows:
subject to
Solving this optimization problem, we obtain the following insights on households' borrowing and investment choices:
1. Loan labels distort household borrowing decisions. In particular, the disutility parameter, κ e , discourages household borrowing if they are not going to make a business investment, even though this would be optimal in the absence of the label.
2. Loan labels distort household investment decisions. In particular, some households will choose not to invest in a toilet because of the disutility associated with diverting the loan to another purpose, even though this would otherwise be optimal in the absence of the label. In addition, some households will be induced to make a business investment if they take a business loan, even though this would be suboptimal in the absence of the label effect.
3. Putting (1) and (2) together, this means that a household could be unable to borrow to make a sanitation investment, even though it has access to credit, and a sanitation investment is otherwise optimal.
Proofs for each of the predictions is provided in Appendix A.
Next, we analyze how household borrowing and investment decisions will change with the introduction of the sanitation loan. We model the sanitation loan as an additional loan, denoted b 2 offered by lenders with an interest rate of r 2 < r 1 . Households can borrow at most b max
2
. As with the business loan, households face a utility cost of κ d b 2 in the period where they take the loan, if they take the sanitation loan and divert it to some other purpose. The household's inter-temporal optimization problem is now as follows:
We analyze how the newly introduced sanitation loan affects households' borrowing choices and sanitation investment choices. Specifically, we focus on analyzing the impact of the loan attributes -the 'sanitation' label, and the lower interest rate -on borrowing and sanitation investment choices.
This analysis (proofs in Appendix A) yields the following insights:
1. Both the label, and the lower interest rate will induce the uptake of sanitation loans.
2. The lower interest rate will not necessarily induce uptake of sanitation loans for sanitation investment only. When the label attached to the loan doesn't matter, it is optimal for the household to switch from the more expensive business loan to the sanitation loan without necessarily changing its investment/expenditure choices. However, this substitution effect is muted when the label matters, decreasing with the size of κ d .
3. The availability of the sanitation loan will motivate sanitation investments by allowing for whom a sanitation investment was optimal, but who were previously constrained from investing in sanitation by the loan label. However, the labelled loan could also lead to overinvestment in sanitation by inducing those who want the loan to make sanitation investments even if these are not otherwise optimal.
Empirical Model
Our empirical strategy builds on the cluster randomized controlled trial to estimate impacts of the intervention on a number of dimensions of household borrowing, and investments including sanitation investments. The experimental design allows us to assess the impact of the provision of sanitation micro-loans, by comparing the outcomes of the treatment group ('SL' hereon) with the outcomes of the 'Control' group.
Specifically, we estimate specifications of the following form using Ordinary Least Squares:
where Y iv is the outcome for household i in GP v, T reatment v takes value of 1 if the sanitation loan was introduced in GP v and 0 otherwise; X iv are household-level controls that help to increase power and precision and θ v are strata dummies for GP v.
In terms of outcome variables, we focus on the uptake of sanitation loans, overall household borrowing from microfinance institutions, formal sources and informal sources; and household sanitation investments. The control variables X iv are chosen according to those that most explain variation in toilet ownership among control households at endline. The key variable satisfying this criterion is toilet ownership at baseline. In addition to this, we add controls for whether a household had a child aged less than 2 years at the time of the intervention roll-out and for ratio between number of sampled clients and village size, to account for potential distortions due to the sampling strategy. See Appendix B for more details on the sampling procedure. Finally, we also include interviewer fixed effects. 21 Standard errors are clustered at the GP level, given the cluster-RCT design. Strata dummies are included in the specification to take into account sample stratification for the randomization at branch of the partner organization and village size.
The key parameter of interest is α 1 , which provides the intention-to-treat (ITT) estimator, which compares the outcomes in the treatment group for all clients active at the time of the intervention roll-out, regardless of whether or not they took a sanitation loan; with those for similar clients in the control group. An advantage of this approach is that we can interpret the experimental intervention as a policy and learn about the impact on the population that the implementing MFI serves. The focus on clients active during the intervention roll-out ensures that the estimates are not biased by households that are particularly motivated to invest in a toilet joining the MFI to obtain a sanitation loan. We note that this design allows us to estimate the impact of introducing sanitation loans over and above any other ongoing, parallel activities promoting sanitation. This is important in this context given the Government of India's SBM-G scheme. An accompanying paper ) analyses the complementarity between the credit intervention and SBM-G policy.
Finally, we check the robustness of our findings to multiple hypothesis testing using the step-down procedure proposed by Romano and Wolf [2005] . The adjusted p-values are reported in Section 6.4
for our key outcomes of interest -sanitation loan uptake, toilet ownership and overall household borrowing; and for secondary outcomes where we find statistically significant impacts.
Results
In this section we report our main results. We start with discussing take-up of the newly introduced sanitation loan, followed by an analysis of how the availability of this new loan product affects
household borrowing. We then analyze investments made and end the section with a discussion on sanitation loan to toilet conversion.
Sanitation Loan Uptake
We begin by studying the pattern of sanitation loan uptake in the study areas using the administrative data from our microfinance partner. The exhaustive information on any loan disbursements, sanitation or otherwise, that took place in the study branches since the start of this impact evaluation, provides us with an objective measure of sanitation credit uptake. The loan uptake evolution is displayed in Figure 2 which shows the cumulative number of sanitation loans per client disbursed By the time of the endline survey, about 20 percent of client households in treatment areas had taken a loan for sanitation. A small number of loans -21 in total -were also provided in the control areas, mainly as a result of clients asking for these loans; rather than them being (mistakenly) advertised in the control areas. These were given in two branches, primarily in February and March of 2016. 22
The slow-down observed in 2016 was reportedly driven by a drought that hit the study area as well as by prolonged cash shortages resulting from the GoI's sudden demonetization in November of 2016. 23
22 Through regular analysis of administrative loan data during the course of the experiment, this provision of sanitation loans could be quickly detected and reminders provided to the field staff on the experimental design.
23 On 8 November 2016, the GoI announced the demonetization of all Rs 500 and Rs 1000 banknotes of the Mahatma Gandhi Series. This was done based on the assumption that the action could curtail the shadow economy and could crack down on the use of illicit and counterfeit cash to fund illegal activity and terrorism. Similar interest rate reductions were made on other loan products at the same time. The graph suggests that there was almost no demand response from clients to these interest rate reductions. We consider impacts on loan demand more formally, by estimating regression equation (1) with sanitation loan uptake as the dependent variable. Results are presented in Table 3 . It indicates a positive and statistically significant impact (at the 1 percent level) on uptake of the sanitation loan.
The coefficient shows that the intervention resulted in an increase in sanitation loan uptake of 18 percentage points.
While this finding establishes positive and significant demand for the new loan product, it is only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for establishing the existence of credit constraints for sanitation. Unconstrained households might simply substitute from different, potentially more expensive, loan sources while keeping overall borrowing and sanitation investments constant. A sufficient condition for the existence of credit constraints for sanitation is that the new loan product results in an increase in sanitation investments . Our analysis thus considers the effects of the intervention on toilet uptake. 
Sanitation investments
The sanitation loan could be used for two types of sanitation investments: (i) construction of a new toilet, or (ii) upgrade or repair of existing toilets. Table 4 tabulates responses by clients who took a sanitation loan (as reported in the MFI administrative data) on what they used this loan for.
The majority of clients (73 percent) report using the sanitation loan for the construction of a new toilet, with fewer than 5 percent reporting upgrade (3 percent) or repair (1 percent) of a toilet. A small number of clients report using the loan for sanitation and other purposes. If we assume that these intended to upgrade or repair an existing toilet, this would suggest that at most around 11 percent of clients who took a sanitation loan used it to upgrade or repair a toilet. Thus, the primary reported reason for taking a sanitation loan was to construct a new toilet. 
In the household survey we collected information on toilet ownership and status that allows us to directly test for whether households made the sanitation investments. By estimating impacts on toilet ownership, we will capture the loan provision's impact on the construction of new toilets and avoiding existing toilets to become dysfunctional. We consider two measures: i) toilet ownership reported by household heads during the household survey, 24 and ii) toilet ownership as confirmed by survey enumerator observation. 25 Table 5 shows the effects of the sanitation loan intervention on toilet ownership status. The table
indicates that the intervention led to a 9 percentage point increase in toilet ownership among study households. Reassuringly, the coefficient estimate is similar across both measures of toilet ownership.
It is of interest to note that this increase is on top of a significant increase in toilet ownership in the control areas since the start of the intervention. When the experiment started in February 2015, 25 percent of control households owned a toilet. By August 2017, this proportion had increased to 45 percent, as indicated by the last row of Table 5 . This almost doubling in toilet coverage among MF client households in control GPs suggests that other factors, notably the Government of India's ambitious SBM(G) policy which started around the same time as the sanitation loan intervention studied here, might have successfully contributed to a boost in toilet construction. 26
We next check whether sanitation loans led to better quality toilets being owned (either because better toilets were constructed or because of upgrade or repair). We do so through surveyors recorded observations of the toilets' characteristics along a number of dimensions, such as the types of materials used to construct the underground chamber, ease of access, cross-ventilation, availability of a lockable door, availability of light among others. We combine the observations into summary measures for underground and overground quality using polychoric principal components analysis.
The analysis reveals one component for underground quality and two for overground quality. A detailed description of the approach we used for the construction of these composite measures is provided in Appendix D. 27 Table 6 displays the findings on these dimensions. The upper panel shows impacts on the overall sample and the lower panel shows impacts, separately, by whether or not the household had a toilet at baseline. The table shows that the provision of sanitation loans led to an improvement in overground quality. The coefficient estimates are however only marginally significant at the 10 percent level of significance. Considering heterogeneity in impacts by baseline toilet ownership, 24 When asking the respondent whether his/her household has a toilet, it was emphasized that toilets that are not frequently used, or not functional, should also be reported.
25 Ultimately, we are interested in safe toilet uptake, not just any type of latrine ownership. Following the guidelines provided in WHO-UNICEF [2017] we define a safe toilet by an improved facility for which excreta is safely disposed of in situ or off-site. Based on this definition, in our data we consider the following types of toilets safe: Flush/pour flush to piped sewer system, septic tank, pit latrine, VIP, pit latrine with slab, composting toilet, biogas system, urine diversion dehydration. We find that 99.6 percent of all reported toilets in our study area belong to any of these categories. Therefore, we consider our measure of toilet ownership (as reported by head of household and by interviewer observation) equivalent to safe toilet ownership in our study context.
26 And yet, this finding indicates that more than half of the MFI clients in control communities still had no toilet in August 2017. Hence, even though it seems likely that the launch of SBM(G) and/or other factors might have triggered a spurt in sanitation activity in the area, there is still scope for complementary interventions, such as the provision of sanitation loans, to make a difference. In Augsburg, Caeyers and Malde (2018) we consider in more detail potential complementarities between the MFI intervention and the SBM subsidy scheme.
27 See Attanasio et al (2018) for further details. results are suggestive of the intervention affecting different overground components for new and existing toilets. However, as we show in Section 6.4, these effects are not robust to adjustments for multiple hypothesis testing.
Coupled with descriptives statistics on households' own reports of how they spent the sanitation loan, we conclude that the majority of loans, if invested into sanitation, are used for the construction of new toilets, and only a small percentage is used for upgrade or repair.
Our findings presented so far show that the sanitation loan is demanded and used for sanitation investments. As a next step, we will analyze the impact of introducing the sanitation loan on total household borrowing, establishing whether sanitation investments are made in addition or instead of other investments.
Household Borrowing
Our analysis of the intervention's impact on household borrowing draws on two sources of datasurvey data reported by the household, and administrative data on microfinance borrowing obtained from credit bureau records. We use this information to assess the intervention's impacts on total household borrowing, and borrowing from specific sources.
As part of the household survey, respondents were asked to report on loans taken since the baseline survey was conducted. As is common in surveys of this type, we collected information on total household borrowing by asking households about the three largest loans (above Rs 500) taken since the start of the experiment. 28 In addition to information such as loan size and outstanding balance, Notes: Sample of households owning a toilet at endline observed by interviewers: 1,289 households. SL refers to sanitation loan treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Covariates: Toilet ownership at baseline, indicator for presence of a child aged 0 -2 at baseline, ratio between number of sampled clients and village size. Strata and interviewer fixed effects included. Column 1 shows intervention impact on quality of the underground chamber, Column 2-3 refer to quality of the overground structure (component 1 and 2). To remove the influence of outliers in the dependent variable, we drop households in the top of the 1 percent of the distribution of total borrowing. SL refers to sanitation loan treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Covariates: Toilet ownership at baseline, indicator for presence of a child aged 0 -2 at baseline, ratio between number of sampled clients and village size. Strata and interviewer fixed effects included. Amounts are in Indian Rupees (1 USD = Rs. 67.5).
respondents were asked to report on the lending source, which we use to classify loans into two categories -formal and informal. 29 We further split formal borrowing into loans from MFIs and those from other formal sources. Table 7 displays estimated impacts of the intervention on total, formal (total formal, MFI, other formal) and informal household borrowing. We find that for all the outcomes considered, the coefficients on the treatment indicator are small in magnitude (compared to the mean in control areas), and are not statistically significantly different from zero. 30 These results thus indicate that the intervention had no significant impact on overall household borrowing. Moreover, we find no statistically significant evidence of switching between formal and informal sources of credit occurred after introducing sanitation loan. The finding that total household borrowing is not affected by the introduction and uptake of the sanitation loans, is despite the fact that the reported average amounts borrowed by households in control areas (reported at the bottom of the table, column (1)) suggest that RBI regulations are not binding for these households, as average borrowing over the whole 2.5 year period is far less than Rs 100,000 annual borrowing limit. 31 Interestingly, the magnitudes and signs of coefficients on MFI, which accounts for around 50 percent information for the month prior to the survey, rather than for the period since the start of the intervention, which is the relevant variable. It would not be possible to obtain an indicator for this without making extremely strong and implausible assumptions (e.g. that the borrowing in the past month is representative of the whole period). Moreover, it is very unlikely that households would be able to aggregate sufficient loans of this size (< 500 Rs.) to invest in a toilet. It is thus reasonable for us to focus our analysis on large loans. 29 We classify as formal sources banks, MFIs, NGOs, cooperatives/savings funds, and SHGs. Informal sources are moneylenders, relatives , friend/acquaintance/private financiers, work, pawnshop and other local shops.
30 Of course, measurement error in borrowing would increase imprecision of the coefficient estimates if it is classical, making it more difficult to detect any impacts. 31 We note that the average reported amount borrowed by a household in our study area (just over Rs 30,000 over the course of the experiment, hence about 12,000 per annum) is nevertheless substantial considering that median self-reported household annual income at baseline was just over Rs 40,000 . A borrowing level of just over 30 percent leaves a household not too far off from being classified as over-indebted according to the World Bank definition which defines a household to be over-indebted if it overall borrowing is 40 percent or more of total HH income. of all formal borrowing, and other formal borrowing (Columns 3 and 4) suggests that there might be some degree of switching between different formal sources taking place; though neither of the coefficients is statistically significantly different from 0.
A concern might be that the survey data is subject to measurement error, making it difficult to identify significant impacts on borrowing. Moreover, some studies have raised the concern of misreporting of borrowing data in surveys (Karlan and Zinman, 2008) , which could affect our ability to identify significant impacts if the misreporting is differential across treatment arms. To alleviate these concerns, and also to study switching behavior among different microfinance products and providers, we turn to analyze the administrative data on borrowing from the implementing MFI and from the credit bureau records. With this data, we are only able to analyze borrowing from microfinance providers, which accounts for around half of all reported formal borrowing. Indeed, as we show in Appendix X, there is evidence of significant underreporting in the survey data, though this is not different by treatment arm.
We first confirm with administrative data from our implementing partner that amounts borrowed for sanitation increased significantly, in line with the impact on loan uptake. This is shown in column (1) of Table 8 . The table also shows impact estimates on loan amounts taken for other loan products (columns (2) to (5)). All coefficients are considerably smaller, insignificant, and -except for education loans -positive. These results confirm that the average client did not shift away from other loan products offered by our implementing partner due to the sanitation loans.
Using credit bureau data, which captures microfinance borrowing from all providers, we can look at whether clients shifted borrowing away from other microfinance providers to take the sanitation loan. Table 9 considers impact estimates on total MFI borrowing (column (1)), borrowing from our implementing partner (column (2)) and borrowing from any other MFI (column (3)). 32 Estimated impacts are also insignificant when considering this data source, but coefficient estimates are much 32 As discussed in Section 3.2.2, we do not have credit bureau data on all clients. Estimating the impacts of the intervention on this sub-sample yields similar estimates to those reported above. These are available on request. larger. 33 The coefficient on amounts borrowed from MFIs is Rs 5,156, primarily driven by additional borrowing from our implementing partner, as shown in column (2). Importantly, the coefficient on borrowing from other MFIs is positive (though insignificant), indicating that there is no evidence of switching away from other MFI lenders.
We conclude that, overall we do not find that the sanitation loan uptake is accompanied by an increase in total household borrowing. Overall formal borrowing doesn't change, though there is suggestive evidence that borrowing from MFIs increased, while that from non-MFI sources likely decreased. However, coefficient estimates are very imprecise, making these conclusions somewhat speculative.
Multiple Hypothesis Testing
Given that our analysis conducts several hypothesis tests, it is possible that we may falsely reject the null hypothesis when it is true for some hypothesis since the probability of conducting at least one Type I error increases with the number of hypotheses tested. We therefore verify whether our results hold once we account for the fact that we are testing several hypotheses. We focus first on our three main outcomes: sanitation loan uptake, sanitation investment proxied by toilet ownership (both household head-reported and interviewer observed) and total household borrowing. Table 10 displays the impact estimates and standard errors for these outcomes in the two rows before reporting the original p-values (3rd row) and those adjusted for the fact that we are testing four hypotheses (4th row). We adjust the p-values using the procedure described in Romano and Wolf 33 With a zero expected impact on total borrowing for the 72 percent of clients who decided not to take up a sanitation loan and an average sanitation loan amount of 15,000, we expect the magnitude of the coefficient estimate of the SL intervention on MFI borrowing to be around 2,700 (=0*0.82 + 15,000*0.18). We do not have sufficient statistical power to detect an average impact of that magnitude.
(2005), who develop a stepwise multiple-testing procedure that asymptotically controls the familywise error rate. We can see that implementing this adjustment changes the significance of our results only marginally. We are hence confident that our conclusions on loan uptake, toilet construction and total household borrowing are not an artifact of multiple hypothesis testing. Contrary to our main outcomes, findings on toilet quality are no longer statistically significant at the ten percent level. Thus, we do not have any robust evidence that the sanitation loan intervention improved the quality of constructed toilets. Sample of households owning a toilet at endline observed by interviewers: 1,289 households. Coefficients report the intervention impact on key outcomes. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in parentheses. 1000 bootstrap replications performed to obtain Romano-Wolf p-values. Covariates: Toilet ownership at baseline, indicator for presence of a child aged 0 -2 at baseline, ratio between number of sampled clients and village size. Strata and interviewer fixed effects included. Column 1 shows intervention impact on quality of the underground chamber, Column 2-3 refer to quality of the overground structure (component 1 and 2).
Channels
Our findings reveal that, although households do not borrow more on average and despite weak monitoring and non-existent enforcement, the introduction and uptake of sanitation loans leads to an increase in toilet ownership. Our model, presented in Section 4 reveals that both the label and loan conditions, particularly the lower interest rates, are important drivers of these results. While we are currently not able to quantify the importance of each of these channels, we will provide evidence that each plays a role in our setting, concluding that loan labels impact borrowing and investment behavior, and can lead to credit constraints despite access to finance. Identifying the exact contributions of the two channels is left to future work. According to the model, the intervention impacts on borrowing and sanitation investment could be driven by two channels: (i) label attached to the loan matters, or (ii) prior loan conditions made sanitation investments unattractive.
We start by providing suggestive, descriptive evidence that the loan label could be driving our findings. The most compelling argument we can make is that a significant number of clients who were eligible to take a sanitation loan decided not to do so and take a business loan instead, despite less favorable loan conditions for the business loan. We find that 62 percent of clients eligible for sanitation loans take a higher-interest business loan instead. It is possible that clients take business loans because of larger borrowing limits. However, if the loan label doesn't matter, and since clients are not constrained to take only one loan at a time, it would be optimal (i.e. cost efficient) for the client to borrow the full sanitation loan and take the remaining loan amount as a business loan. We find that a significant proportion of clients fail to do so: 31 percent of all clients in the treatment area took a business loan of over Rs. 25,000 (the lowest amount that can be taken as separate sanitation and business loans) even when they are eligible for a sanitation loan. This suggests that the loan label likely matters for household borrowing decisions.
However, we also find evidence suggesting that the label effect is not sufficiently strong for all clients.
This evidence comes from examining the loan-to-toilet conversion rate. We have seen in Section 6.1 that 20 percent of clients took a sanitation loan and in Section 6.2 that 9 percent owned a new toilet.
This suggests a loan-to-toilet conversion rate of almost 50 percent. We can conduct a more formal analysis by looking at the impact of loan uptake on toilet construction and instrumenting sanitation loan uptake by the intervention. Doing so we make the implicit, and plausible, assumption that that the entire effect on toilet uptake is driven by the loan. The results are presented in Table 12 .
Columns (2) and (4) show the IV outputs for our two measures of toilet uptake, confirming a loan-to-toilet conversion rate of 48-50 percent.
Half of the loans are hence not used for toilet construction and, as we showed above, usage for repair and uptake cannot account for the remaining 50 percent, leaving a substantial percentage of loans that have not been used for sanitation investment. This is confirmed when looking back at Table 4 , which displays self-reported sanitation loan use. We can see that almost one third of clients report themselves that they did not use any of the loan amount to invest into sanitation. SL refers to sanitation loan treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Covariates: Toilet ownership at baseline, indicator for presence of a child aged 0 -2 at baseline, ratio between number of sampled clients and village size. Strata and interviewer fixed effects included. Amounts are in Indian Rupees (1 USD = Rs. 67.5).
We cannot exclude that these households had initially intended to use the loan for sanitation but some circumstance or another made them not do so. In either case, we can conclude that for at least one third of sanitation loan takers, the label effect was not strong enough to ensure its usage for sanitation. Further statistics we can bring forward to support the notion that the label did not imply a binding investment purpose include (i) 28 percent of clients that took a sanitation loan already a toilet when they did so, and (ii) 9 percent of clients that took a sanitation loan and said they used it for a new toilet, did not actually have one at the time of the endline survey.
Thus, this descriptive evidence suggests that both the loan label, and other loan attributes -primarily the interest rate -drive the findings of the impacts of the sanitation loan program.
Conclusion
This paper provides first rigorous evidence on the effectiveness of labelled loans in improving the adoption of a lumpy human capital (health) investment -a household toilet. Drawing on a cluster randomized controlled trial in rural Maharashtra, India, and rich data from a primary household survey and two novel sources of administrative data on borrowing (loan-level data on lending by the partner MFI, and credit bureau reports) we show that providing credit labelled for sanitation is an effective approach to motivate toilet construction.
A simple theoretical framework shows that loan labels can distort household borrowing and investment choices towards the labelled investment. Moreover, in the absence of a product labelled for a specific investment, a household may be unable to borrow for that investment even if it has access to credit. The introduction of the sanitation loan would thus relax this constraint. However, the analysis also shows that other loan attributes -particularly the interest rate -will also influence household borrowing and investment responses. On the one hand, a lower interest rate would induce households to substitute away from more expensive credit sources, while keeping overall borrowing and investment choices constant. On the other hand, the lower interest rate might make the desired investment more affordable.
Our empirical analysis show that microcredit based approaches can increase household toilet adoption, with toilet ownership increasing by 9 percentage points in our context. We find very little evidence of loan use for repairs or upgrades. This increase is measured around 2.5 years after the start of the intervention. This finding has important implications for policy and policy design. Much attention has been given to two widely used approaches to boost sanitation uptake -Community Led Total Sanitation and subsidies. However, recent literature has raised concerns about the ability of CLTS to boost the uptake of safe sanitation in a significant manner, particularly since it does not relax financial constraints (e.g. Abramovsky et al. 2018 , Cameron et al. 2013 ). While its effectiveness has been shown when implemented with intense follow-up and in combination with subsidies [Pickering et al., 2015 , Clasen et al., 2014 , Patil et al., 2014 , both approaches are very costly and can be difficult to target effectively [Lipscomb and Schechter, 2018] . Sanitation micro-loans offer another viable and effective alternative to these policies.
We analyze descriptively which of the loan label, and lower interest rate, can explain our results, and find evidence consistent with both mattering. On the one hand, we find that a significant proportion of households who have access to the cheaper sanitation loan choose to take a more expensive business loan instead. Moreover, 31 percent of households, who could lower the overall cost of credit by taking a combination of the cheaper sanitation loan and a more expensive business loan choose not to take the sanitation loan. However, we also find evidence consistent with the interest rate mattering. In particular, we find that only around 50 percent of sanitation loans result in a new toilet, with few loans reported to be used for upgrade or repair. Being able to pin down a relatively accurate compliance rate is an important contribution to the literature. Very few studies have attempted to measure compliance with expected use of microfinance loans, particularly those that are not bundled with a specific product -as was the case here -, in an objective manner.
Given the challenges to objectively verify actual loan use (e.g. business inventory might be sold off), researchers typically rely on survey questions asking a respondent how they spent a loan use to assess compliance. The latter method is not very accurate since respondents may over-report compliance in household surveys as shown by Karlan et al. [2014] .
Studies of microcredit programs that are bundled with specific health investments do frequently report on the presence of the investment as measured by survey enumerators. See for example Benhassine et al. [2015] , Tarozzi et al. [2014] , Yishay et al. [2017] . Interestingly, Yishay et al. [2017] , who measure the effects of microcredit availability on willingness to pay for sanitation in rural Cambodia, report than not more than 30 percent of households who took the loan construct a latrine 18-24 months after receiving loan offers; compared to 50 percent in our case. The low conversion rate they report is of particular interest when considering that households did not receive cash, as in our case, but were provided with toilet construction materials at their doorsteps. Two product design differences might play a role. For one, the credit they provide is given as an individual liability loan, whereas in our context loans are joint liability. Attanasio et al. [2015] show that group liability attracts different types of borrowers than individual liability contracts do. Second, the implementing partner introduced a rule that only clients who had been with them for at least one year could avail a sanitation loan, whereas in the context of Yishay et al. [2017] loans were given to those who wanted to purchase a specific toilet model, regardless of their borrowing history with the lender. 
Appendix A Proofs
In this section, we provide the proofs underlying the model predictions. We start by analyzing household choices in the absence of the intervention. The household's optimization problem can be written as follows:
At the optimum, the budget constraints will bind. Imposing this equality, and then substituting for c n1 and c n2 in the objective function 10, we obtain the following simplified problem:
Characterizing the Optimal Solution
To solve the problem, we set up the Lagrangian, and obtain the first order conditions:
The first order conditions are as follows:
Re-arranging these, we get the following conditions:
When neither one of the borrowing constraints binds, the household chooses whether to borrow an additional dollar of loan b 1 by trading off the gain from the additional consumption it can enjoy in period 1 with the reduced consumption in period 2 (to repay the loan) and the utility penalty it experiences if it chooses to spend the dollar on something other than the durable E. Interestingly, the disutility associated with the label will influence borrowing decisions even when the maximum borrowing constraint binds. 34 Similarly, the label also enters the first order condition relating to the durable E: the household will trade-off the cost of the investment (net consumption given up in period 1) with the increased consumption in period 2, and a utility boost, κ e b 1 , if it had borrowed the amount b 1 . By contrast, the labelling parameter doesn't enter the first order condition relating to the toilet investment decision. This condition trades off the lost non-durable consumption to invest in the toilet (LHS) with the discounted benefit of the toilet (RHS).
Totally differentiating 16, we get that
By concavity of v(.), v (c n1 ) < 0 and v (c n2 ) < 0. Thus db 1 dκ e < 0 if e 1 = 0; and db 1 dκ e = 0 if e 1 = 1.
Thus, as the disutility associated with diverting the loan to another purpose increases, households that want credit, but for whom a business investment is not optimal (given the label effect), will be discouraged from taking the business loan.
Next, we consider how the label affects households' investment decisions. Since c d + c e > b max 1 , the household will face a trade-off between the two investments unless y 1 is sufficiently high. In 34 When the non-zero borrowing constraint binds, b1 = 0, and the label related penalty will not apply.
choosing which of the two investments to make, the household will compare the net present benefit associated with each investment, and choose the investment that generates the highest net present benefit. In other words, the household will choose to invest in a toilet over the business investment if:
When the label attached to the loan matters, money will no longer be completely fungible; and households for whom the difference in net benefit from a toilet and that from the business investment is less than κ e b 1 will choose to invest in the business investment rather than the toilet, which would have been optimal for the household had the loan b 1 been unlabelled.
Interestingly, a household might choose to make a business investment if it takes the loan, even though it might not otherwise be optimal. That is, some households for whom βsv (c n2 )
would be induced to make the business investment if they take the business loan.
Finally, a household might choose not to make either investment if neither investment yields a positive net benefit.
Thus, the label attached to the loan might discourage households from investing in a toilet, even when it might be otherwise more optimal for the household to invest in a toilet, and it has access to credit.
The insights from this analysis can be summarized:
Analyzing the Effect of the Intervention
When the sanitation loan is made available, the household's inter-temporal optimization problem can be written as:
At the optimum, the budget constraint will bind in each period. Using this, we can substitute for c 1 and c 2 in the objective function to obtain the following more simplified problem.
The associated Lagrangian is:
The first order conditions are:
Examining the first order condition for the sanitation loan, b 2 , we can see that the label and interest rate both affect the loan take-up decision. As with the business loan, we can show that db 2 dκ d < 0 if d 1 = 0, which implies that the label effect discourages households from taking a sanitation loan if they do not intend to use it for sanitation purposes. Moreover, the extent to which the household is discouraged depends on the value of κ d , the strength of the label effect. The higher the value of κ d , the lower the amount of b 2 taken if it is to be used for some other purpose than sanitation. Thus, the label discourages sanitation loan take-up by those who don't want to invest in sanitation.
In order to assess the effect of the interest rate, we need to consider both the direct effect of the interest rate on borrowing the sanitation loan; and indirect effects that operate through substitution effects with the other business loan.
The direct effect of the interest rate can be assessed by calculating
Thus, a household will borrow less as the interest rate rises. We next consider the indirect effect through substitution with other credit sources. First, consider how household choices are affected when the new loan is introduced, r 2 < r 1 , and the label associated with the loan doesn't matter.
Combining the first order conditions related to b 1 and b 2 yields:
Re-arranging, we get the following
Notice that only one of λ 1 or λ 2 can be positive at any one time; and similarly for λ 3 and λ 4 . When The optimal borrowing solution when households can borrow different types of loans with different interest rates, and when the label attached to a loan doesn't matter will be such that a household first borrows from the cheapest source, and borrows from the next cheapest source once the first source is maxed out. Thus, keeping overall borrowing constant, the introduction of a cheaper source of credit should lead to households substituting away from more expensive sources of credit towards the new cheaper source.
However, this type of substitution is dampened when the label matters. Now, the intended investment choice will also influence which loans are taken. Combining the two first order conditions, we
Consider a household that wants to take a (cheaper) sanitation loan for a business investment, or to consume it. In this case, b 2 > 0 and b 1 = 0. The condition above simplifies to
Thus, the analysis thus far yields the following predictions:
Next, we consider how the decision to invest in a toilet is affected by the introduction of the sanitation loan. Households that were going to invest in both goods in the absence of the intervention will continue to do so. We will thus focus on the households who couldn't borrow enough to fund both investments.
Recall that in the absence of a sanitation loan, a household would invest in sanitation rather than
The sanitation loan allows households that could afford to borrow more (i.e. for whom the borrowing constraint was binding, or for whom the label effect was binding) and wanted to invest in sanitation (so for whom the net benefits from investing in sanitation were positive) to increase their borrowing and invest in a toilet. For these households, we would expect overall borrowing to increase, and the toilet to be constructed.
There will also be households whose inter-temporal budget constraint doesn't allow them to borrow enough to make both investments, even if the net benefit from each investment was positive. The presence of the sanitation loan alters the condition for building a toilet over the business investment to the following:
The household will switch to a sanitation investment rather than a business investment if βm −
Thus, take up of the sanitation loan (when available) allows households for whom the difference in net benefits from sanitation investments relative to business investments between κ e b 1 and κ e b 1 − κ d b 2 to now invest in sanitation.
Finally, some households for whom βm − c d v (c n1 ) < 0 and βsv (c n2 ) − (c e − s)v (c n1 ) < 0; and
> 0 might be induced to make a sanitation and/or business investment if they want the loan for some other purpose by the label effect. Thus, the label effect could also lead to inefficient investment.
B Appendix -Sampling description
The sample was selected from 81 eligible study GPs. An eligible GP was defined as one where (i) the MFI had active lending groups (kendra) and (ii) where sanitation activities had not been undertaken in the past. Through interactions with MFI staff, we identified areas where no sanitation were ongoing but they were planned (and/or considered feasible) in the near future. Then we matched the list of kendra groups that were active in the selected area to the GPs they were located in.
During the process, kendras located in urban areas were excluded. At the end of the listing process 81 GPs in five blocks (corresponding to MFI branches) within two districts were identified as our study area. As a second step we randomized the selected GPs to one of two evaluation arms: Control or SL. Randomization was stratified by branch and by size of the GP (size in terms of number of households). Within each GP the following sampling procedure was applied:
Step 1: in those GPs where only one kendra is present, we sampled all clients in that kendra
Step 2: in those GPs where more than one kendra is present, kendras with at least one client sampled at the baseline were sorted randomly within the GP, and all client households from the top kendra of each GP were picked.
Step 3: As more clients were needed to reach the desired sample size, a third step was conducted following this strategy: kendras not fully sampled (but with at least one client sampled at baseline)
were randomly sorted, and the top 'x' kendras were picked until we reached the desired sample size.
Note that at this stage, no sorting at the GP level was done.
C Appendix -Additional Tables Credit bureau information available for 2,514 households. SL refers to sanitation loan treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in parentheses.*, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. To remove the influence of outliers among regressors, borrowing values above the 99th percentile of the distribution are taken out. Analysis is conducted over 2,491 observations. Covariates: Toilet uptake status at baseline, dummy =1 if household has a child aged 0 -2 at time of intervention roll-out, ratio between number of sampled clients and village size. Strata and interviewer fixed effects included.
D Appendix -Variable definition
Toilet quality
To measure quality of a toilet's underground structure, we use information on materials used to construct the underground chamber (good quality materials such as cement rings and brick ensure Sample size of endline survey: 2,841 households. CB stands for credit bureau data. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. HH stands for household. Column 2 and 3 report variables' mean and standard deviation (in parenthesis) for CB and no CB sample respectively. Column 4 reports differences in variables' mean between CB and no CB sample. Toilet ownership at baseline is reconstructed from toilet construction dates reported at endline. If a toilet was in the dwelling when household moved in we consider number of years HH head lived in the household as a proxy of construction date.
that the underground chamber will not collapse), and also whether the interviewer observes flies or bad smells. Discussions with experts identified the latter two as indicators of poor quality construction of the underground chamber. We aggregate these variables into one measure using polychoric principal components analysis. Only one factor in the polychoric PCA has an eigenvalue greater than 1.
To measure quality of the overground structure, we use an indicator based on observations of the toilet made by the survey interviewers at the time of the endline survey. Interviewers made notes on the quality of the super-structure (whether it is temporary, semi-permanent or permanent), ease of access, lighting in the toilet (at day and at night), availability of a lock and a lockable door, whether there is sufficient distance between the toilet pan and the wall, and whether the toilet has crossventilation. The polychoric PCA procedure combining these variables generated two components with eigenvalues greater than 1. Sample of households owning a toilet observed by interviewers at endline: 1,289 households. SL refers to sanitation loan treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Covariates: Toilet ownership at baseline, indicator for presence of a child aged 0 -2 at baseline, ratio of number of sampled clients to village size. Strata and interviewer fixed effects included. Sample of households owning a toilet observed by interviewers at endline: 1,289 households. SL refers to sanitation loan treatment arm. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level are shown in parentheses. *, **, *** indicates significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Covariates: Toilet ownership at baseline, indicator for presence of a child aged 0 -2 at baseline, ratio of number of sampled clients to village size. Strata and interviewer fixed effects included. Table C .5: Intervention impact on quality of the overground structure
(8) Table C .6: Intervention impact on quality of the overground structure by toilet ownership at baseline
(8) Tables 7 and 9 reveal an interesting caveat of our data: comparison of the household survey data and the credit bureau data reveals some important discrepancies, which warrant further investigation.
E Comparing credit data sources
In particular, household survey data substantially underestimates total formal household borrowing.
As shown in Table 7 , while households report having borrowed, on average, just over Rs 31,000 since the start of the intervention, the credit bureau data indicates average borrowing of more than Rs 85,000. 6,575 Notes: SL refers to sanitation loan treatment arm. Average total borrowings from survey data are computed both on the 2,841 households included in the endline household survey and the 2,514 households included in the credit bureau data. This is in line with other provided evidence of survey respondents' under-reporting when asked about credit and debit activity (Zinman [2009] ; Karlan and Zinman [2008] i) and unlikely related to recall error or survey instrument design. Regarding recall error, we see that the percentage of borrowing not reported in the survey data is quite similar over the course of the intervention as shown in the same table. As for survey instrument design, it would be perceivable that the capped number of loans we ask the respondent about lead to an underestimation of total borrowing. However, as can be seen in Table, only 23 percent of respondents, balanced by treatment and control, report on three loans, suggesting that at most a fifth of the sample would have a total borrowing amount that is censored at the top due to asking about a limited number of loans.
We believe it unlikely that this under-reporting is driven by the introduction of the sanitation loans, implying that our impact estimates should not be biased by it. We therefore feel confident in our finding that total household borrowing remains unaffected by the introduction and uptake of the newly introduced sanitation loan product. 
